Raw materials are essential to the global economy and for
maintaining and improving our quality of life. Recent years
have witnessed rapid growth in the use and demand for metals or
industrial minerals used in high-tech products. Availability of
these materials at competitive prices is essential for advances
in high-tech products, clean energy technology and
commercialising new inventions.
Most demand and supply analyses emphasise
technical, economic, environmental and social parameters and
technologic breakthroughs. "Criticality analysis" does the
same, but focuses on identifying and evaluating the risks and
impacts of supply disruptions on the economy, national
security, implementing green energy programmes, or other
initiatives, depending on the interests of the organisation
that commissions the study. Metals that are commonly perceived
as "critical" or "strategic" are rare earth elements (REE),
tantalum (Ta), niobium (Nb), lithium (Li), beryllium (Be),
gallium (Ga), germanium (Ge), indium (In), zirconia and
graphite.
For many materials (e.g., limestone, silica sand and iron),
reserves, resources and producing mines are abundant and widely
distributed. For these materials, future supply is not at risk
and can be crudely assessed by using the ratios of global
reserve/yearly production and global resource/yearly
production. For other materials (e.g., heavy rare earth
elements (HREE), Nb, antimony (Sb)), the assessment is more
complex. Factors such as authoritarian regimes, monopoly- or
oligopoly-type market conditions, political instability and
potential or existing regional conflicts can threaten reliable
supply and analyses must account for these risks. Furthermore,
some high-tech metals are derived as by-products of base metal
extraction (e.g., Ga, Ge and In). Their level of production
cannot be easily increased independently of the main base metal
co-products, without a major increase in their price.
According to the Webster’s New Collegiate
Dictionary (1975), the distinction between "critical"
("indispensable for the weathering, solution, or overcoming of
a crisis") and "strategic" ("required for the conduct of war
materials, or necessary to, or important in, the initiation,
conduct, or completion of strategic plan") may be seen as
subtle or non-existent. These definitions are more or less in
line with current European use (e.g., European Commission (EC),
2011 and 2014a), where "critical" materials are considered to
be of high economic or trade importance, whereas "strategic"
materials are those essential to a country’s
defence. In North America, Ishee et al. (2013), define a
mineral as "critical" if it is essential to a vital sector of
the US economy and as "strategic" if it is "important to the
nation’s economy, particularly for defence issues;
does not have many replacements; and primarily comes from
foreign countries". However, the same publication acknowledges
that US government-wide definitions do not exist. Similar to
government publications, the distinction between the terms
"critical" and "strategic" is largely lost in scientific and
technical publications, trade journals and newspapers.
This article summarises lists of critical and strategic
materials prepared by the EC, the US Department of Defense
(DoD) and the US Department of Energy (DoE), emphasising that
lists of critical and strategic materials differ, based on
whether the criticality
analyses is being applied to the general economy (EC), the
military (DoD), or clean-air technologies (DoE) and that these
lists change through time due to technological breakthroughs,
political pressures and instabilities, and depletion of
resources. It underlines that the designation of a material as
"critical" or "strategic" depends on the subject and focus of
study; therefore, if the terms "critical" and "strategic" are
used, they should be clearly defined in an early portion of the
publication and should not be applied out of context.
Case studies
Critical raw materials from the economic point of
view: the EC
With a long mining history, most major near-surface deposits
in Europe have been mined out. Some deposits in densely
populated areas are undeveloped due to strict environmental
regulations. Therefore, discovery, permitting and development
of new mines in Central and Western Europe appear more
difficult relative to other parts of the world. Securing
reliable access to raw materials at competitive prices is an
ongoing concern for most industrialised European countries,
such as the UK and Germany, and is reflected in several studies
(e.g., Erdman et al., 2011; British Geological Survey, 2012; EC
2011, 2014a,b).
The EC released its first report on critical raw materials
for the EU in 2011, updating it in 2014 (EC, 2011, 2014a, b),
with plans to produce revised versions every three years. The
methodology used in both studies is identical. Economic
importance was determined by assessing the proportion of each
material associated with industrial mega-sectors at an EU
level. These proportions were then combined with the
mega-sectors’ gross value added to the
EU’s GDP. The total was then scaled according to
the total EU GDP to define an overall economic importance for
the material. To quantify the supply risk, the EC relied on the
World Governance Indicator (WGI). The WGI includes factors such
as voice and accountability, political stability and absence of
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of
law and control of corruption (EC, 2014a). Both iterations
identified critical metals in terms of two key factors: 1)
importance to the economy of the EU; and 2) an estimate of the
level of risk associated with supply of each material under
consideration.
The 2011 study identified 14 materials as critical from a
starting list of 41 non-energy, non-food materials. This list
included cobalt (Co), fluorspar, graphite, magnesium (Mg),
platinum group elements (PGE), REE (yttrium (Y), scandium (Sc),
lanthanum (La), cerium (Ce), praseodymium (Pr), neodymium (Nd),
samarium (Sm), europium (Eu), gadolinium (Gd), terbium (Tb),
dysprosium (Dy), holmium (Ho), erbium (Er), thulium, ytterbium
(Yb) and lutetium (Lu)), tungsten (W), Ta, Sb, Be, Ga, Ge, In
and Nb (EC, 2011).
The 2014 study started with a list of 54 materials and
identified 19 as critical (Figure 1). The extended
list included seven new abiotic materials and four biotic
materials, including coking coal. For the purpose of this
article, biotic materials are omitted. In addition to this
expansion, the REE were subdivided into "heavy" and "light"
categories (EC, 2014a). The current list of critical inorganic
materials specific to the European community includes: borates,
chromium (Cr), fluorspar, magnesite, natural graphite,
phosphate rock, heavy REE, light REE, silicon metal, Sb, Be,
Co, Ga, Ge, In, Mg, Nb, PGE and W (EC, 2014a). Ta and Sc were
downgraded to non-critical in the 2014 study.
Critical and strategic materials from the military
point of view: US DoD
A study commissioned by the US DoD considered the stockpile
requirements and availability of 76 materials (US DoD, 2013).
It identified 23 materials that would exhibit "shortfalls"
during a hypothetical four-year time interval, consisting of
one year of all out conflict involving the US followed by three
years of recovery (starting in 2015 and lasting until the end
of 2018). Referred to as "critical and strategic", the
materials determined to be in shortfall are tin (Sn), aluminum
oxide fused (Al2O3), bismuth (Bi),
manganese (Mn), silicon carbide (SiC), fluorspar (acid grade),
Sb, W, Ta, Ge, Be, Cr, Dy, Er, Ga, Tb, Tm, Y, Sc and four
proprietary materials, including three types of carbon fibres
and a rare earth oxide (Figure 2).
Critical materials from the clean energy point of
view: US DoE
A report prepared by the US DoE Office of Policy and
International Affairs (US DoE, 2011) highlighted the importance
of 16 elements needed to develop clean technologies, such as
wind turbines, electric vehicles, photovoltaic thin films and
energy-efficient lighting, and light REE (especially La and Ce)
as catalysts to produce gasoline. The criticality of these
materials was assessed for the periods 2011 to 2015 and 2015 to
2025. Both assessments were based on: 1) the importance to
clean energy; and 2) the level of supply risk. In the
assessment for 2015 to 2025 (Figure 3), Nd, Dy, Eu, Y
and Tb were considered critical, Li and tellurium (Te) were
considered near-critical and Ce, La, Sm, Pr, Mn, Co, In, Ga,
and nickel as non-critical. In the earlier assessment period,
Li was judged as non-critical, whereas Ce, La, Te and In were
classified as near-critical. Dy, Eu, Nd, Tb and Y remained on
the critical list during both assessment periods.
Summary
Table 1 summarises the results of four criticality
studies released since 2011. The document released by the EC in
2011 lists all REEs, plus 13 other materials. The
EC’s 2014 report identified five industrial
minerals, REE (excluding Sc), PGE and 10 other metals and
coking coal as critical. The list of strategic and critical
materials prepared for the US DoD (2013) reported 23 materials
as strategic and critical, including SiC, fused
Al2O3, fluorspar, seven REEs (one of
which is not shown in Table 1), 10 metals, and three
types of carbon fibre (also omitted from Table 1). The
report of the US DoE (2011) found five REEs (Nd, Dy, Eu, Y and
Tb) to be critical and two metals (Li and Te) to be
near-critical for the period of 2015 to 2025 (Figure 3
and Table 1). Thirteen materials are common to at
least three of the studies but only three elements (Dy, Tb, and
Y) are common to all four studies.
Conclusion
The lack of consistency in use of the terms "critical" and
"strategic" leads to misunderstandings, miscommunications and
potentially misrepresentations. Which materials are considered
critical depends to a large extent on the priorities and
objectives of the organisation or country that commissions the
study. Therefore, if the terms "critical" and "strategic" are
used, they should be clearly defined and should not be applied
out of context. The lists of critical and strategic
materials produced by the EC (2011 and 2014), the US DoD (2013)
and the US DoE (2011) differ significantly and illustrate this
point. The longest list of critical materials comes from the EC
(2014), which considered risks to overall economy and was broad
in focus. The shortest list comes from the highly focused study
of the US DoE, which considered only the supply risks for
materials essential to develop clean air technologies. Lists of
critical materials change with time because of breakthroughs in
technology, political instabilities in major producing
countries, environmental pressures and discovery, development,
or exhaustion of resources.
Acknowledgments
Reviewed by Michaela Neetz of the British Columbia
Geological Survey.
References
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to supply risk index for elements or element groups that are of
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Erdman, L., Behrendt, S., and Feil, M., 2011. Kritische
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European Commission, 2011. Critical raw materials for the
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*George J Simandl is a specialist at the British
Columbia Geological Survey, Ministry of Energy and Mines, based
in Victoria, BC; Carlee Akam is a student at the School of
Earth and Ocean Sciences, University of Victoria; Suzanne
Paradis is a research scientist at the Geological
Survey of Canada, Pacific Division, based in Sidney, BC.
Corresponding author: George.Simandl@gov.bc.ca